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INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere on the periphery of Middle Eastern-American poli-
tics is the story of Yasser Abbas. Yasser Abbas is a businessman 
and the son of Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Authori-
ty. In 2012, Foreign Policy magazine published an article questioning 
the sources of Yasser Abbas’ wealth.1 The article alleged that Ab-
bas had accumulated his wealth through his family lineage and po-
                                                                                                                            
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2017; B.A., Classics, 
Bowdoin College, 2011. Thanks to Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his guidance, 
support, and thoughtful critique; thanks to the Board of the IPLJ for its generosity and 
assistance this year; and thanks to Dorothy Kadar for her unwavering love and friendship. 
1 Jonathan Schanzer, The Brothers Abbas, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 5, 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/05/the-brothers-abbas/ [https://perma.cc/A929-
PVS6]. 
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litical ties, as well as from American taxpayers.2 Abbas then sued 
Foreign Policy’s publisher in federal court in the District of Colum-
bia.3 Foreign Policy sought a quick dismissal under the District of 
Columbia’s recently enacted anti-SLAPP statute.4 Anti-SLAPP 
statutes are meant to deter filing of meritless suits meant to chill 
free speech.5 District Judge Sullivan granted Foreign Policy’s mo-
tion and dismissed the suit.6 
Abbas appealed dismissal of his defamation suit on the ground 
that federal courts should not be governed by non-federal proce-
dural devices—like the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP sta-
tute—aimed at implementing state and local anti-litigation poli-
cies.7 Deviating from the majority of other federal courts of appeals 
that have addressed the issue (i.e., the First, Fifth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits), the D.C. Circuit accepted Abbas’s federalist argument.8 
The D.C. Circuit held that the District of Columbia’s special mo-
tion to dismiss statute did not apply in federal courts sitting in di-
versity.9 Employing the analysis laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,10 
the D.C. Circuit found that Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure govern in a federal diversity case, and therefore 
denied application of the District of Columbia’s special motion to 
dismiss statute.11 Admittedly, Abbas enjoyed only a Pyrrhic victory 
                                                                                                                            
2 See id. 
3 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 783 
F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
4 Id. at 9–10. 
5 “SLAPP” is an acronym standing for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation.” See discussion infra Section I.A. 
6 Abbas, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
7 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1332. 
8 Id. at 1335–36. 
9 Id. 
10 559 U.S. 393 (2010). In Shady Grove, the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality 
decision, found that section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice and Law Rules did not 
apply in federal diversity jurisdiction because section 901(b) conflicted with Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 399. The Court applied a two-step framework for 
deciding whether to apply a Federal Rule or a state law in diversity jurisdiction. First, a 
court should not apply a state law if a Federal Rule “answer[s] the same question” as the 
state law. Id. at 398–99. Second, a court must apply the Federal Rule if it does not violate 
the Rules Enabling Act. Id. 
11 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333. 
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because the D.C. Circuit actually applied the federal rules to reach 
the same result, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.12 Nev-
ertheless, Abbas puts a federalist issue in free speech litigation front 
and center: Are federal courts required to accord deference to the 
twenty-eight states who seek to curb abusive litigation practices 
attacking free speech? Are they even permitted to do so? 
This Note compares the different treatment of state anti-
SLAPP laws in federal courts, especially in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shady Grove. This Note posits two reasons why 
special motions to dismiss should not apply in federal courts sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction. First, state anti-SLAPPs conflict directly 
with Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be-
cause these Federal Rules directly address the question as to dis-
missal on the pleadings and on summary judgment. Second, a find-
ing that the state anti-SLAPP procedures conflict with the Federal 
Rules will not frustrate legislatures’ interests in swatting down 
chilling litigation. This is so because federal courts retain the power 
to screen meritless defamation suits through the available pleading 
and summary judgment rules. 
Part I introduces the two main legal authorities whose conver-
gence is the topic of this Note: state anti-SLAPP laws, provisions 
that either immunize certain speech or dismiss litigation chilling 
free speech; and Shady Grove,13 the most recent opinion on Federal 
Rule-state rule conflicts. Part II analyzes federal diversity cases ap-
plying anti-SLAPP special motions since Shady Grove, notably, Go-
din v. Schencks14 and Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC.15 It also 
looks at other courts’ responses to this problem. Part III then ar-
gues that federal courts should not apply anti-SLAPP provisions 
that generate powerful state-based motions to dismiss. Lastly, this 
Note concludes that the approach in Abbas and similar cases does 
not frustrate the aims of anti-SLAPP laws. 
                                                                                                                            
12 Id. at 1339–40. 
13 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
14 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
15 783 F.3d at 1328. 
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I. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AND SHADY GROVE 
A. Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
In 1992, professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan 
coined the term “SLAPP”—Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation—in response to a growing number of suits attempting 
to stifle political speech.16 Such lawsuits target individuals and 
groups participating in political advocacy and government petition-
ing.17 Under numerous aliases, including defamation, SLAPP filers 
attempt to “privatize public debate . . . transform[ing] a public, po-
litical dispute into a private, legal adjudication” at the expense of 
defendants.18 The suits, usually meritless, force defendants to 
spend money mounting a legal defense.19 When defendants win, it 
is a Pyrrhic victory because they have spent considerable sums in 
filing and attorney’s fees.20 Defendants without resources face de-
faults or unfavorable settlements.21 Most importantly, the suits dis-
courage future speech—a severe threat to First Amendment ex-
pression.22 
To combat the proliferation of SLAPPs, Professors Pring and 
Canan argued for legislation, inter alia,23 to combat protected 
                                                                                                                            
16 George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U. 
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 938 (1992). 
17 Id. Examples of targeted political activity that professors Pring and Canan cited 
include: 
Voicing criticism at a school board meeting; [t]estifying at a zoning 
hearing against a new real estate development; [s]ending a letter to 
public officials; [r]eporting police misconduct; [f]iling a complaint 
with a government consumer, civil rights, or labor relations office; 
[r]eporting violations of law to health authorities; [l]obbying for 
reform legislation; [and] [f]iling administrative agency appeals. 
Id. 
18 Id. at 941–42 (“Thus, citizens may involve themselves in a city hall zoning dispute, 
only to find that ‘city hall’ has become ‘courtroom,’ and ‘zoning’ has become 
‘defamation’ or ‘interference with business.’”). 
19 See id. at 943–44. 
20 See id. at 944. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. (citing Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616 
N.Y.S.2d 98 (1994)). 
23 See id. at 950. Pring and Canan argued for lawyers representing SLAPP targets to file 
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Id. 
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speech.24 The professors suggested two kinds of legislation to com-
bat pernicious SLAPP suits. The first was an anti-SLAPP statute 
creating substantive privileges and immunities for protected 
speech.25 The second, relying on Protect Our Mountain Environ-
ment, Inc. v. District Court,26 would establish procedural safeguards 
to summarily dispose of SLAPP suits and deter would-be SLAPP 
filers.27 
States have heeded the warnings of Professors Pring and Ca-
nan. As of the end of 2015, twenty-eight states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Guam have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.28 Colorado 
and West Virginia have implemented similar rules through judicial 
precedent.29 The various statutes are not uniform in their applica-
tion; states employ either one or both of the substantive and proce-
dural safeguards.30 
                                                                                                                            
24 See id. at 958. 
25 See id. at 958–59. 
26 Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) 
(establishing summary disposition and burden-shifting standards in a SLAPP case 
targeting defendant’s petitioning activity). 
27 See Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 959–61. 
28 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to -752 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 
to -508 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.18 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 8136–8138 (1992); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505 (2012); FLA. STAT. 
§§ 720.304, 768.295 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (1998); 7 GUAM CODE ANN. 
§§ 17101–17109 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to -4 (2002); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
110/1–110/99 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. 
art. 971 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 5-807 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (1996); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01–
.06 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241–,246 (1994); 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635–.670 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2-9.1–.2 (2001); N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1430–1440 
(2014); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150–.155 (2010); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301–8305 
(2001); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1004 
(1997); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2011); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78b-6-1401 to -1405 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (2005); WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500–.525 (2010). 
29 See generally Protect Our Mountain Env’t, 677 P.2d 1361; Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 
549 (W. Va. 1993). 
30 Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500–.525 (containing both privilege/immunity 
provisions and special motions to dismiss), with D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505 
(containing only a special motion to dismiss provision), and 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 
-4 (containing only a privilege/immunity provision). 
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Some anti-SLAPP statutes grant immunity to only certain 
speech or protected activity. These statutes are based in part on the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine31 and in part on common law immuni-
ties.32 For example, Rhode Island’s section 9-33-2 grants condi-
tional immunity to speech exercised under the right of petition or 
free speech in connection with a matter of public concern.33 It 
carves an exception for sham proceedings. The statute exempts the 
targeted party’s petitioning or free speech activity if it is objectively 
and subjectively baseless, mirroring the requirements set out in 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 
Inc.34 However, Professors Pring and Canan warned that such im-
munity provisions were imperfect safeguards for SLAPP targets.35 
                                                                                                                            
31 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine grants immunity to citizens petitioning the 
government from antitrust liability through the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference 
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); accord In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685–86 (2d Cir. 2009). This immunity extends to 
concerted actions before courts and administrative agencies. See Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. at 510–11. When, however, petitioning activity “ostensibly directed toward 
influencing governmental action[] is a . . . sham to cover what is . . . nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor[, then] the 
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. The sham 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not insulate petitioning activity that is 
both objectively baseless and an attempt to directly interfere with a competitor’s business 
relationships through the use of the governmental process. See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). Whether the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine applies outside of the antitrust context is a question of some dispute. 
See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine to be generally applicable as a First Amendment principle); Mosdos Chofetz 
Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F. Supp. 2d 568, 594–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(collecting cases and finding the doctrine applicable in a civil rights suit). 
32 Three privileges come to mind. First, the judicial privilege grants people absolute 
immunity for “communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial 
proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought.” 
Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (Pa. 2004). Second, there exists a qualified privilege 
for defamatory statements made by private individuals to police or state attorneys prior to 
institution of criminal suits. See Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992). 
Last, defamatory statements in publications that are a “full, fair, and accurate account of 
[an] official proceeding” receive qualified immunity under the fair-report privilege. 
Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
33 See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (1993). 
34 See id.; see also Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60. 
35 Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 958. 
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Enter the special motion to dismiss, the preferred solution of 
Professors Pring and Canan and twenty-five jurisdictions.36 The 
special motions to dismiss resemble the standard set forth in Protect 
Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court.37 Looking at the 
Washington anti-SLAPP statute is instructive. First, the anti-
SLAPP statute applies in any case based on the right to petition or 
the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public con-
cern.38 Next, the special motion requires the movant to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that its action was based on the 
above First Amendment rights.39 If the movant meets that burden, 
the non-movant must then demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that it will prevail on the claim.40 The court must consider 
the pleadings and outside affidavits stating facts upon which the 
liability or defense is based.41 It must also stay all discovery pending 
resolution of the motion, with targeted discovery allowed for good 
cause shown.42 Finally, the motion moves up the judge’s docket, 
and if the movant wins, it receives attorney’s fees.43 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute presents a variant strain on the 
special motion, one based on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.44 SLAPP filers must verify that the pleadings: (1) are 
grounded in fact; (2) are warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument requiring its change; (3) do not assert claims against 
                                                                                                                            
36 Id. at 959–61. 
37 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the court 
should treat the motion as one for summary judgment based on a heightened 
constitutional standard when plaintiff sues for judicial or administrative abuse of process 
and defendant files a motion to dismiss based on the right to petition. Id. at 1370. Plaintiff 
must show that defendant’s petitioning was not immunized under the First Amendment 
because: (1) defendant’s claims had no cognizable basis in law or fact; (2) the primary 
purpose of defendant’s activity was to harass plaintiff or accomplish an improper 
objective; and (3) defendant’s petitioning adversely affected plaintiff’s legal interests. Id. 
at 1369. 
38 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(a)–(e) (2010). 
39 § 4.24.525(4)(a)–(b). 
40 § 4.24.525(4)(b). 
41 § 4.24.525(4)(c). Note the mandatory nature of this rule, especially in contrast to 
Rule 12(d). See discussion infra Section II.C.2. 
42 § 4.24.525(5)(c). 
43 § 4.24.525(5)(c), (6)(a)(i). 
44 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (1996); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-506 (2005) 
(containing a verification requirement in place of the special motion to dismiss). 
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statements privileged by Georgia’s privilege provision; and (4) are 
not asserted to suppress free speech, harass, delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation.45 The claim is stricken if it is not veri-
fied within ten days.46 If plaintiff verifies in violation of the statute, 
the court may dismiss the claim and impose sanctions.47 
Because the anti-SLAPP statutes expressly incorporate the lan-
guage of the First Amendment defamation cases, they seek to add 
another layer of protection to certain speech. Professors Pring and 
Canan noted that many SLAPP cases are filed as defamation cas-
es.48 In turn, states like Washington apply the special motions to 
dismiss when the defendant’s action includes: 
Any oral statement made, or written statement or 
other document submitted, in a place open to the 
public or a public forum in connection with an issue 
of public concern; or [a]ny other lawful conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right of free speech in connection with an issue of 
public concern, or in furtherance of the exercise of 
the constitutional right of petition.49 
Statements “in connection with an issue of public concern” in-
clude speech protected in cases such as New York Times v. Sulli-
van,50 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,51 and Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Hepps.52 Provisions like these give defendants, especially 
                                                                                                                            
45 § 9-11-11.1(b). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. For a recent defamation case holding that section 9-11-11.1 of the Georgie code 
violates Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Royalty Network, Inc. v. 
Harris, 756 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2014). 
48 Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 947. 
49 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(d)–(e) (2010). 
50 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, in libel cases, the First Amendment 
requires plaintiffs who are public officials to prove that defendants published statements 
with actual malice—knowledge of or reckless disregard toward the statements’ falsity). 
51 388 U.S. 130, 134, 155 (1967) (extending Sullivan to apply to public figures—people 
“who are not public officials, but who are . . . involved in issues in which the public has a 
justified and important interest”). 
52 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that, under the First Amendment, private figures 
in libel cases suing over an issue of public concern have the burden of proving both falsity 
and fault before recovering damages, in contravention of the common law of libel). 
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media defendants, yet another tool to fight defamation suits: sum-
mary disposition at the pleading stage. 
The special motion to dismiss is ultimately one more protection 
given to defendants in public figure libel cases based on the First 
Amendment. First, public officials and figures must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that defendants published with “actual 
malice” (i.e., with either knowledge or reckless disregard as to the 
statements’ falsity).53 Second, courts cannot hold defendants 
strictly liable in a libel case under the First Amendment.54 Third, 
plaintiffs have the burden of proving a publication’s falsity, as well 
as fault, before recovering damages—an inversion of the common-
law rule.55 Fourth, the First Amendment precludes recovery from 
statements that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as 
stating actual facts about the public figure involved.”56 Fifth, plain-
tiffs must also prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence 
at summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or on a motion for directed verdict under Rule 50.57 
Last, appellate courts must engage in de novo review of the whole 
record in constitutional defamation cases, bypassing Rule 52(a).58 
B. Shady Grove and the Federal Rules 
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., petitioner medical practice sought to maintain a class action in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under 
Rule 23.59 Petitioner also asserted federal jurisdiction over the 
claims under the Class Action Fairness Act.60 Petitioner tendered a 
                                                                                                                            
53 See Butts, 388 U.S. at 155; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
54 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
55 See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776. 
56 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); see also Old Dominion 
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–
86 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 
57 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
58 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492, 499 (1984); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
59 See 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010). 
60 See id. at 397 n.3. The Class Action Fairness Act grants federal courts jurisdiction 
over class actions under Rule 23 where: (1) the aggregate value of the claims exceeds five 
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claim for insurance benefits to respondent Allstate Insurance 
Company, which paid the claims late and refused to pay the ac-
crued interest on the overdue payments.61 Petitioner sought relief 
on behalf of a class of all to whom respondent Allstate owed inter-
est.62 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York dis-
missed the case for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons.63 First, it 
found that section 901(b) precluded class actions from recovering a 
“penalty.”64 Second, because petitioner could no longer maintain 
its suit as a class action, the court found that its individual claim, 
approximately five hundred dollars, did not meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).65 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that there was no 
conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b), that section 901(b) 
was substantive under Erie, and that section 901(b) thus applied in 
federal diversity suits.66 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that 
petitioner could file a suit under Rule 23.67 The Court laid out a 
two-step framework to determine whether a federal rule or state 
rule applied in a federal diversity case. First, a court must deter-
mine whether the rule “answers the question in dispute. If it does, 
it governs.”68 In Shady Grove, the question was whether petitioner 
could maintain his suit as a class action.69 The Court found that by 
                                                                                                                            
million dollars and (2) minimal diversity exists between the parties (i.e., any plaintiff is 
from a different state than any defendant). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). 
61 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. 
Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
64 Id. 
65 Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2015) (“Unless a statute creating or 
imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the 
recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of 
recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis 
added)). 
66 Id. at 398 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 
137 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
67 Id. at 399. 
68 Id. at 398 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5, (1987) (“The 
initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule 38 is 
sufficiently broad to cause a direct collision with the state law or, implicitly, to control the 
issue before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.”)). 
69 Id. 
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the terms of Rule 23, a “class action may be maintained” if the two 
criteria set forth in Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are met.70 Rule 23 directly 
conflicts with section 901(b), which states that actions seeking sta-
tutory penalties “may not be maintained” as a class action.71 
Therefore, under the first step, section 901(b) cannot apply, unless 
Rule 23 is ultra vires.72 
Second, a court must determine whether the federal rule “falls 
within the statutory authorization” of the Rules Enabling Act.73 
Congress has the power both to supplant state law and to create 
rules for the federal courts.74 The test for a federal rule’s validity is 
whether the rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s,] or modif[ies] any substan-
tive right,” which in turn requires asking whether the rule “really 
regulates procedure.”75 The Court found that Rule 23 falls within 
the Rules Enabling Act because a class action is merely a process 
for adjudicating multiple claims at once.76 It neither changes the 
parties’ legal rights nor alters the rules of decision.77 The Court 
emphasized the tough challenge any party faces when attempting 
to displace a federal rule: “We have rejected every statutory chal-
                                                                                                                            
70 Id. at 398–99; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and 
if . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
71 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2015). 
72 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399. 
73 Id. at 406; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power 
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the 
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and 
courts of appeals. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All 
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have 
taken effect.”). 
74 Id. at 406; see also Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 5 (“The Rule must then be 
applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking authority, which 
originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules Enabling 
Act”). 
75 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–07 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)); see also 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (defining procedure as “the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them”)). 
76 Id. at 408. 
77 Id. 
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lenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.”78 Because the 
federal rule applied and was not invalid, the Court felt no need to 
conduct the “murky” Erie analysis (i.e., whether enforcement of a 
right in state or federal court would encourage forum shopping and 
inequitable administration of the laws).79 
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and in the judgment, joined 
the majority on the narrowest ground: Rule 23 applied in the in-
stant case.80 However, he also agreed with the dissent in arguing 
that some state procedural rules might apply in federal court be-
cause such rules are a part of the “state’s definition of substantive 
rights and remedies.”81 Justice Stevens called for application of the 
Rules Enabling Act with sensitivity to important state interests and 
regulatory policies.82 Ultimately, Justice Stevens said, a federal rule 
does not apply in a case where the state law is procedural “but is so 
intertwined with a state right or remedy that functions to define the 
scope of the state-created right.”83 In the instant case, he con-
cluded that section 901(b) did not define New York’s rights and 
                                                                                                                            
78 Id. at 407; see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 
533, 554 (1991) (upholding the validity of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 8 (upholding the validity of Rule 38 of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (upholding 
the validity of Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (upholding the validity of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946) 
(upholding the validity of Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Sibbach, 312 
U.S. at 14–15 (1941) (upholding the validity of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
79 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. The Court in Shady Grove cited Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna, two of the seminal cases on the Erie doctrine. 
In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), announcing that in 
federal cases invoking diversity jurisdiction, the law of the state is the rule of decision 
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.” Erie, 
304 U.S. at 77–78. Nearly thirty years later, in Hanna, the Court reflected on the Erie 
doctrine in light of the Rules Enabling Act. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64. There, the 
Court held that in federal diversity cases where a state rule conflicts with a Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure, courts should apply the federal rule if it neither exceeds the Rules 
Enabling Act nor transgresses the Constitution. See id. 
80 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
81 Id. at 417. 
82 Id. at 424. 
83 Id. at 423. 
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remedies, and that Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling 
Act.84 
In short, Shady Grove held that section 901(b) did not apply in 
federal cases invoking diversity jurisdiction.85 First, because Rule 
23 entitles any eligible party to file a class action, it supplants state 
laws prohibiting the same suits.86 Second, Rule 23 is valid under 
the Rules Enabling Act and the U.S. Constitution.87 Justice Ste-
vens, however, wrote separately to add that some state procedural 
rules might be a part of “the [s]tate’s definition of substantive 
rights and remedies.”88 
II. ANTI-SLAPP CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Godin v. Schencks 
In Godin v. Schenks, Pat Godin, a former principal at an elemen-
tary school in Maine, filed a defamation suit against defendants 
Patty Schencks and two other individual defendants.89 She also 
filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Machiasport School 
Department Board of Directors and School Union No. 134, alleging 
due process violations.90 After plaintiff was hired as principal of the 
Fort O’Brien Elementary School in 2006, the school received 
complaints about plaintiff’s conduct toward students from the 
three individual defendants.91 In May 2008, the school board con-
ducted an investigation into plaintiff’s allegedly abusive conduct; a 
month later, the investigation concluded the allegations were un-
supported.92 On June 6, 2008, Godin received notice from the 
school board that her employment was terminated due to “budge-
                                                                                                                            
84 Id. at 432. 
85 Id. at 399 (majority opinion). 
86 Id. at 398–99. 
87 Id. at 408. 
88 Id. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
89 629 F.3d 79, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. at 80. The claims against defendants School Board and Union No. 134 were not 
under review on appeal to the First Circuit. Id. 
91 Id. at 81 n.1. Defendants Schencks, Nicely, and Metta reported to either the school 
board, the Maine Department of Health, or Human Services and the Maine State Police 
that plaintiff treated her students abusively. Id. 
92 Id. at 81. 
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tary constraints caused by ‘significant subsidy loss.’”93 Godin then 
sued the school board and the union under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
brought state law defamation claims against former school em-
ployees Schencks, Nicely, and Metta.94 
The individual defendants filed a special motion to dismiss un-
der the Maine anti-SLAPP statute, section 556.95 Plaintiff did not 
dispute that the individual claims derived from defendants’ exer-
cise of their right to petition.96 Under section 556, a party may 
move to dismiss an action when it asserts that the adversary’s 
claims are “based on the moving party’s exercise of the moving 
party’s right of petition” under either the Maine or U.S. Constitu-
tion.97 A court must grant the special motion, unless the non-
movant demonstrates: (1) that movant’s exercise of its right of peti-
tion lacked “any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in 
law” and (2) that movant’s acts “caused actual injury to the res-
ponding party.”98 In addition, a court must look at both the plead-
ing and the supporting and opposing affidavits.99 Last, a court must 
also stay discovery unless the court finds, “on motion and after a 
hearing and for good cause shown,” that “specified discovery be 
conducted.”100 
The district court denied the special motion, holding that sec-
tion 556 conflicted with Rules 12 and 56 and therefore did not apply 
in federal court. The First Circuit first determined, sua sponte, that 
it had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.101 
Second, on interlocutory appeal, the court found that it had appel-
late jurisdiction over the order denying section 556 under the colla-
teral order doctrine.102 Next, the court had to determine whether 
section 556 applied in the instant federal proceeding. 
                                                                                                                            
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 81–82; see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). 
96 Godin, 629 F.3d at 82 (quoting § 556). 
97 § 556. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. The statute also provides a successful movant with costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees. Id. 
101 Godin, 629 F.3d at 83. 
102 See id. at 83–84; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 
(1949) (establishing the collateral order doctrine and finding appealable those orders that 
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Because the court had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 
state law claims, it had to engage in the general Erie analysis: de-
termining whether section 556 was a “substantive” or “procedur-
al” rule.103 First, it held that Federal Rules 12 and 56 did not 
preempt application of section 556 because those two rules did not 
attempt to answer the same question or address the same subject as 
section 556.104 Section 556 provides a supplemental and substantive 
mechanism to protect defendants exercising constitutional peti-
tioning activities.105 Rules 12 and 56, on the other hand, govern all 
categories of suits.106 Rule 12(b)(6) only exists to “test the suffi-
ciency of the complaint,” whereas section 556 dismisses claims 
where plaintiff challenges defendant’s petitioning activity yet can-
not meet Maine’s special rules for protecting such activity.107 Rule 
56, on the one hand, grants parties judgment before trial when 
there are no disputed material issues of fact, and as a matter of law, 
one party is entitled to judgment.108 Section 556, on the other hand, 
requires courts to consider whether the defendant’s conduct had a 
reasonable basis in fact or law and whether the conduct caused in-
jury.109 For those reasons, the court found section 556 addressed 
neither of the questions posed by Rules 12 and 56.110 The court 
avoided conducting a Rules Enabling Act analysis.111 
                                                                                                                            
“finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to 
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”). 
103 Godin, 629 F.3d at 85; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 
427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) 
(finding that Erie applies when a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over a 
state law claim). 
104 Godin, 629 F.3d at 88. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.; see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980) (“The first 
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently 
broad to control the issue before the Court.”). 
107 Godin, 629 F.3d at 89 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 89–90. 
111 Id. at 90. 
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The court found that failing to apply section 556 would encour-
age forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.112 
Section 556 “substantively alters [state]-law claims” by shifting the 
burden to plaintiff to prove that defendant’s petitioning had no le-
gal or factual basis, by awarding attorney’s fees to successful de-
fendants, and by replacing the common-law libel per se damages 
standard with an actual injury standard.113 If such a rule does not 
apply in federal court, plaintiffs would have a strong incentive to 
file state-law claims in federal court, avoiding section 556 altogeth-
er.114 Inequitable administration of the law would result; defen-
dants in federal court would have fewer protections than an iden-
tical defendant in state court.115 As a result, the court reversed the 
district court’s order and remanded the case.116 
B. Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group 
Plaintiff Yasser Abbas is the son of Palestinian Authority leader 
Mahmoud Abbas and is a businessman with interests in the Middle 
East.117 In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, Abbas sued defednants 
Foreign Policy magazine and journalist Jonathan Schanzer based on 
an online article titled “The Brothers Abbas.”118 The article ad-
dressed the sources of his and his brother Tarek’s wealth.119 Specif-
ically, the article begins with two questions: “Are the sons of the 
Palestinian president off their father’s system?” and “Have they 
enriched themselves at the expense of regular Palestinians—and 
even U.S. taxpayers?”120 Among other things, the article chroni-
cles allegations of corruption leveled against Mahmoud Abbas, not-
ing his sons’ conspicuous wealth.121 Once Abbas filed suit, defen-
dants moved to dismiss under both District of Columbia section 16-
5502(a) and Rule 12(b)(6).122 The district court granted defendants 
                                                                                                                            
112 Id. at 92. 
113 Id. at 91. 
114 Id. at 92. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., 783 F.3d 1328, at 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
118 See Schanzer, supra note 1. 
119 Id. 
120 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1331. 
121 See Schanzer, supra note 1. 
122 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333. 
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the special motion to dismiss and denied their Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
as moot.123 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s 
decision on the defendant’s special motion to dismiss.124 The court 
first found a conflict between the federal rules and section 16-
5502(a); both “answer the same question” as to the circumstances 
when a court must dismiss a case before trial.125 To survive a sec-
tion 16-5502(a) special motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must show 
that it is likely to succeed on the merits.126 Rule 12(b)(6) allows 
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss by “simply alleging facts” 
sufficient to state a facially plausible claim.127 Rule 56(a) permits 
summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no ge-
nuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”128 Rules 12 and 56 form an exclusive, 
integrated, and less stringent program for determining pretrial 
judgment in federal court.129 Therefore, the court found the federal 
rules were broad enough to displace section 16-5502(a).130 
Comparing Rules 12 and 56, the court found that those rules 
did not violate the Rules Enabling Act,131 which states that federal 
rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”132 Here, the court noted the difficulty of applying Shady 
Grove: the fractured decision holds no “common conclusion” for 
determining what standard governs when comparing federal rules 
with the Rules Enabling Act.133 The court sided with the Scalia plu-
                                                                                                                            
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1332. 
125 Id. at 1333–34, 1336. 
126 See id. at 1332; see also D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2012). 
127 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). 
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
129 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334. 
130 Id. The court also rejected claims defending the provision as applicable because: (1) 
it is simply another layer to add to a Rule 56 summary judgment motion; (2) the special 
motion is another way of creating a form of qualified immunity; (3) the federal rules, as 
evidenced by Congressional amendment (i.e., the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995) are not to be rigidly construed; and (4) other Courts of Appeals have found 
so. See id. at 1334–36. 
131 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337. 
132 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
133 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)). 
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rality and applied Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. Rules 12 and 56, accord-
ing to the plurality in Shady Grove, “really regulate[] procedure.” 
Therefore, Rules 12 and 56 applied, and the court denied defen-
dant’s special motion to dismiss. 
The court, however, still dismissed plaintiff’s claim under Rule 
12(b)(6).134 Applying the plausibility pleading standard required by 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,135 the court held that defendant had 
not made a defamatory statement about plaintiff.136 Defendant had 
merely asked questions. A “question,” the court said, “however 
embarrassing or unpleasant to its subject, is not accusation.”137 It 
then remarked that questions had rarely given rise to successful 
defamation claims in other jurisdictions.138 The court refused to 
chart new territory in defamation law, and thus dismissed plain-
tiff’s claim.139 
C. Other Cases 
The federal landscape is divided. Other circuits have weighed 
in on whether anti-SLAPPs are substantive or procedural under 
Erie with a resultant split on either side. The Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits have found that anti-SLAPPs apply in federal court.140 The 
Seventh Circuit, however, has held that Washington’s anti-SLAPP 
statute does not apply in federal court, but decided the case on dif-
ferent grounds than its lower court.141 
                                                                                                                            
134 Id. at 1339. 
135 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (retiring the liberal pleading standard allowed by Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and requiring plaintiffs “to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face”). 
136 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1338–39. 
137 Id. at 1338 (quoting Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1094 (4th Cir. 
1993)). 
138 Id. at 1338–39. 
139 Id. at 1339. 
140 See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); United 
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.1999). 
141 Compare Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 791 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(applying the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision that section 4.24.525 violates the 
right to trial by jury under the Washington Constitution), with Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel 
Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding that section 4.24.525 
conflicts with Rules 12(d) and 56 and therefore does not apply in diversity suits). 
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1. Pro-Substance: Henry and Newsham 
In Henry v. Lake Charles American Press LLC, the Fifth Circuit 
applied article 971 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and 
dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claim.142 There, the plaintiff, own-
er of a military jet fuel concern, sued the defendant after it had pub-
lished that defendant sold “contaminated fuel” to the government 
that caused its military aircraft to “flame out.”143 The lower court 
denied defendant’s special motion to dismiss, and defendant ap-
pealed.144 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote that “Louisiana 
law, including the nominally-procedural article 971, governs this 
diversity case.”145 
Applying state law interpreting article 971, the court found that 
defendant had made a prima facie showing that it published on an 
issue of public concern.146 Having shifted its burden, the plaintiff 
then had to show, on the motion to dismiss, a probability of success 
on the merits using the pleadings as well as supporting and oppos-
ing affidavits.147 The court found that the plaintiff had little chance 
of proving the defendant had not reasonably inquired into the falsi-
ty of its statements, partly because the district court, in applying 
article 971, had stayed discovery.148 With little evidence, the plain-
tiff could not prove the requisite elements of libel, and the court 
dismissed. 
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., a 
case on which the Henry court relied, provides a more helpful anal-
ysis of the nature of the anti-SLAPP statute.149 Though decided 
eleven years before Shady Grove, Newsham compared California’s 
anti-SLAPP provision, section 425.16, with Federal Rules 12 and 56 
in the same framework.150 The plaintiffs sued Lockheed Missiles 
                                                                                                                            
142 566 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 2009). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 168–69 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Newsham, 190 
F.3d at 972–73). 
146 Id. at 181. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 181–83. 
149 Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972. 
150 Id. at 972. 
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under the False Claims Act151 for fraudulently billing the federal 
government.152 Lockheed Missiles filed a counterclaim, at which 
point the plaintiffs moved to dismiss under the California anti-
SLAPP statute and Rule 12(b)(6).153 On recommendation from a 
special master, the district court granted the relators’ special mo-
tion to dismiss.154 Relators appealed, wishing to recover attorney’s 
fees under the anti-SLAPP provision.155 
The Ninth Circuit found that the provision applied in federal 
court, remanding the case for the district court to rule on the mo-
tion.156 First, the court asked whether the anti-SLAPP statute 
would directly collide with the Federal Rules.157 Although it admit-
ted a “commonality of purpose” between the two rules, namely, 
“expeditious weeding out of meritless claims before trial,” the 
court found no conflict.158 First, it saw no indication that Rules 12 
and 56 were meant to occupy the field of pretrial procedures.159 
Second, the anti-SLAPP statute concerned an interest separate 
from that of the federal rules: protection of constitutional free 
speech and petition.160 Next, defendant had identified no counter-
vailing federal interest requiring application of Rules 12 and 56.161 
Finally, the court found that serious forum-shopping concerns 
would arise if it had failed to apply the anti-SLAPP statute. Plain-
tiffs would always seek a federal forum, knowing the statute would 
not apply.162 Therefore, the court applied the California anti-
SLAPP statute. 
It should be noted that several Ninth Circuit judges have ex-
pressed disagreement with the holding announced by the three-
                                                                                                                            
151 The False Claims Act allows private individuals, known as “relators,” to file civil 
suits in the name of the government against persons who make fraudulent claims for 
payment to the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012). 
152 Newsham, 190 F.3d at 967. 
153 Id. at 972. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 973. 
157 Id. at 972. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 973. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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judge panel in Newsham. In Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC 
(Trump II), Circuit Judge Watford and three other judges dissented 
from the denial of rehearing en banc of an anti-SLAPP motion to 
strike.163 In the first appeal, Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC 
(Trump I), the Ninth Circuit had dismissed Trump University’s 
defamation counterclaim against Makaeff, finding her letters and 
postings protected First Amendment speech.164 Dissenting in 
Trump II, Judge Watford found that section 425.16 conflicted with 
the federal rules.165 Ultimately, Judge Watford argued that Rules 12 
and 56, linked by the mandatory language of Rule 12(d), “establish 
the exclusive criteria for testing the legal and factual sufficiency of 
a claim in federal court.”166 
2. Pro-Procedure: Intercon 
The Seventh Circuit, in Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action 
Network, has found Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable 
in federal court, by way of irony: it followed precedent from the 
Supreme Court of Washington.167 The Seventh Circuit in Intercon 
chose not to decide whether Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute 
conflicted with the federal rules, as the Northern District of Illinois 
District Court had done below.168 Instead, it followed state deci-
sional law—substantive law under Erie.169 Because the Supreme 
Court of Washington found that section 4.24.525 violated the 
Washington Constitution’s right to trial by jury, there was “no re-
maining state substance” to compare against Rules 12 and 56.170 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court.171 
The lower court, however, squarely faced the issue in a lengthy, 
complicated opinion. Plaintiff Intercon Solutions was a provider of 
                                                                                                                            
163 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Trump II), 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). 
164 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Trump I), 715 F.3d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 2013). 
165 Trump II, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 1188. 
167 791 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2015). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. (citing Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015)). 
171 Id. 
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electronic recycling services in Illinois.172 It had asked defendant, a 
certifier of electronic recycling businesses, to perform an audit so 
that it could obtain e-Stewards certification.173 Among other things, 
plaintiff sued in defamation and false light, claiming that defendant 
falsely published that Intercon shipped two containers of illegal and 
hazardous materials to Hong Kong and China.174 Defendant had 
published this information on its own website, and released it to 
“selected news media” and the Illinois and federal environmental 
protection agencies.175 
Defendants sought to dismiss the action on two fronts. First, 
defendants asserted that they were immune from liability under 
section 4.24.510176 because defendant’s publications conveyed in-
formation to government agencies and were of reasonable concern 
to them.177 Second, defendants sought to apply section 4.24.525, 
the special motion to dismiss, because defendant’s actions involved 
public participation and plaintiff could not prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that it would prevail on its claims.178 
The district court found that defendant’s statements, when re-
leased to the Illinois and federal environmental protection agen-
cies, were immune from civil liability.179 Section 4.24.510 requires 
that: (1) the statement must be reported to a “branch or agency of 
federal, state, or local government,” and (2) the statement must be 
regarding a “matter reasonably of concern to that agency or organ-
ization.”180 Defendant had conveyed the information to the envi-
                                                                                                                            
172 Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 
2013). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 1031. 
175 Id. at 1031, 1038. 
176 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010) (“A person who communicates a complaint or 
information to any branch or agency of federal, state, or local government, or to any self-
regulatory organization that regulates persons involved in the securities or futures 
business and that has been delegated authority by a federal, state, or local government 
agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune from civil liability for 
claims based upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matter 
reasonably of concern to that agency or organization . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
177 Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 1038. 
180 Id. at 1037 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010)). 
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ronmental protection agencies.181 Moreover, the court found that 
reports of shipping hazardous waste in contravention of state and 
federal law to be of reasonable concern to those agencies.182 There-
fore, the court found the statements made to the government im-
mune under section 4.24.510.183 
The lower court conducted an extensive analysis of Rule 12(d) 
in its decision not to apply section 4.24.525, the special motion to 
dismiss. First, it engaged in the requisite Shady Grove analysis,184 
framing the precise question: Whether a federal court may look to 
the pleadings and to outside materials and dismiss a plaintiff’s 
claims preliminarily based on defendant’s showing “that those 
claims are based on an action involving public participation and pe-
tition” and plaintiff’s subsequent failure to “establish by clear and 
convincing evidence a probability of prevailing” on the claim?185 
The court then quoted Rule 12(d) in full.186 The court found that 
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure added Rule 
12(d) in 1946 to “link Rule 12 with Rule 56 to provide the exclusive 
means for federal courts to rule upon a pretrial motion to adjudi-
cate a case on the merits based on matters outside the com-
plaint.”187 The Advisory Committee clarified that if extraneous 
material is included under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion would become 
a summary judgment motion.188 If the motion becomes a summary 
judgment motion, then both parties must have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to submit extraneous proofs “to avoid taking a party by sur-
prise.”189 
                                                                                                                            
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1038. 
183 Id. However, the court found the statements did not immunize defendant for claims 
arising under section 4.24.510 for communications made to the media or on the Internet. 
Id. at 1038–39. 
184 See id. at 1042–44. 
185 Id. at 1044. 
186 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), 
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion.”). 
187 Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (quoting 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 98 
(D.D.C. 2012)). 
188 Id. at 1045. 
189 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment). 
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As compared to Rule 12(d), section 4.24.525 directly interferes 
with the federal rules’ mode of operation, and is therefore void. 
First, section 4.24.525 poses a higher evidentiary burden on a 
plaintiff than does Rule 12 and allows dismissal on the merits with-
out tying the motion to summary judgment.190 Second, the manda-
tory language of section 4.24.525 conflicts with the discretionary 
operation of Rule 12(d).191 Last, section 4.24.525 imposes a clear 
and convincing standard on plaintiffs, without discovery, in contra-
vention of the “genuine issue of material fact” standard of Rule 
56.192 For those reasons, the Northern District of Illinois refused to 
apply section 4.24.525, and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss 
Intercon’s defamation claims.193 
III. ABBAS, INTERCON, AND DIVERSE SLAPPS 
Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction should follow Ab-
bas and Intercon. Anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss disrupt the exclu-
sive method of pretrial procedure inscribed in Rules 12 and 56, as 
linked by Rule 12(d). As a matter of pretrial procedure, the courts 
have repeatedly insisted on maintaining important federal interests, 
to wit, uniform pleading and summary judgment practice. The like-
lihood that Abbas will create forum shopping does not warrant its 
reversal, because the Constitution created diversity jurisdiction in 
part to combat local prejudice. Moreover, the rule in Abbas and In-
tercon, when combined with the significant protections of the First 
Amendment, does not make it any easier for plaintiffs to prevail. 
Anti-SLAPP statutes with special motions to dismiss are not 
Erie-substantive, and therefore do not apply in federal court. De-
fendants arguing the opposite will likely point to two reasons. First, 
                                                                                                                            
190 Id. at 1047. 
191 Id. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), 
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court . . . .” 
(emphasis added)), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010) (“In making a 
determination under (b) of this subsection, the court shall consider pleadings and 
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is 
based.” (emphasis added)). 
192 Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
193 Id. at 1055. The court noted that the plaintiff, a public figure, had sufficiently pled 
actual malice, and that defendant’s statements were not statements of opinion. Id. at 
1057–58. 
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a nominally procedural rule that works to define the scope of the 
state-created right should apply in federal court. Second, if the rule 
is found not to be substantive, it will create serious forum shopping 
concerns. 
The first argument relies upon Justice Stevens’ concurrence in 
Shady Grove for support. First, if the federal and state rules can 
coexist side by side, then the court must follow Erie and the Rules 
of Decision Act.194 Because the anti-SLAPP statutes apply only to 
suits challenging constitutional free speech rights, they are meant 
to supplement, not supplant, the general federal rules.195 Second, 
even if there is a direct collision, courts should not presume 
preemption, especially if such a preemptive reading contravenes 
the Rules Enabling Act.196 The federal rules should be read with 
sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.197 
Here, defendants find that the anti-SLAPP statute creates a right—
the ability to dismiss certain suits based on constitutional free 
speech at pretrial—that, while nominally procedural, is really subs-
tantive. 
The second argument raises a serious concern: Failure to apply 
anti-SLAPP statutes in diversity will create forum shopping and 
inequitable administration of the laws. The courts in Godin and 
Newsham applied the anti-SLAPP statutes partly out of this fear.198 
Under this line of reasoning, a plaintiff suing a diverse defendant 
over a defamatory news story would always choose the federal fo-
rum, knowing the statute would not apply. As a result, the defen-
dant would be treated inequitably, as the defendant cannot avail 
herself of what she believes to be a substantive state right. 
The first argument fails because the federal rules so obviously 
conflict with the state rule. To survive a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to state a 
                                                                                                                            
194 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 421 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
195 See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010). 
196 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422–23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)). 
197 See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001); 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
198 See Godin, 629 F.3d at 91; United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & 
Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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facially plausible claim.199 Moreover, “plausibility” is not “akin to 
a probability requirement.”200 Special motions to dismiss, howev-
er, require a plaintiff to establish “by clear and convincing evidence 
a probability of prevailing on the claim.”201 This same standard 
generally conflicts with Rule 56, which requires only a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.202 Moreover, anti-SLAPP statutes 
require a stay of discovery, as opposed to Rule 56, which allows for 
liberal discovery prior to summary judgment.203 The statutes re-
quire that a court consider materials outside the pleadings, but 
without tying the motion to summary judgment, in contrast to Rule 
12(d).204 Finally, Rules 12 and 56, like all the other rules, apply to 
all cases in federal court, necessarily occupying the field of the anti-
SLAPP statutes.205 Therefore, there is a direct conflict, and Rules 
12 and 56 apply. 
The existence of a direct collision with Rules 12 and 56 calls for 
the rules’ application, not their exclusion. Even Semtek Internation-
al Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., a case applying Rule 41(b) with 
sensitivity to state claim preclusion law, stated that “federal refer-
ence to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which 
the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”206 Here, the 
federal interest supports uniform procedure, which might not be 
attained if the courts defer to each state’s particular anti-SLAPP 
statute.207 The cleaner approach, therefore, is to allow the federal 
rules to stand on their own. 
                                                                                                                            
199 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
200 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
201 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010) (emphasis added). 
202 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
203 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(5)(c); see also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2721 
(3d ed. 1998). 
204 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(c). 
205 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 
(2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
206 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“If, for 
example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation 
of discovery orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their own processes might 
justify a contrary federal rule.”). 
207 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965); see also Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 
LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., dissenting) (finding that California 
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While forum shopping and inequitable administration are valid 
concerns, reference to Erie is inappropriate when comparing a fed-
eral rule of civil procedure with a state rule. Invalidating a federal 
rule whenever it alters enforcement of state rights would “disem-
bowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal proce-
dure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling 
Act.”208 This statement in Hanna, quoted in Shady Grove, echoes 
the belief that created diversity jurisdiction in the first place: For-
eign citizens may be prejudiced in state courts against resident de-
fendants.209 The Supreme Court famously expressed this senti-
ment in Bank of United States v. Deveaux: 
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of 
the states will administer justice as impartially as 
those of the nation, to parties of every description, it 
is not less true that the constitution itself either en-
tertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with 
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehen-
sions of suitors, that it has established national tri-
bunals for the decision of controversies between 
aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different 
states.210 
The Constitution itself allows federal courts to administer dis-
putes between diverse citizens, and as to procedure, some diver-
gence from state law is the attendant, and perhaps intended, re-
sult.211 
In addition, the fact that a defendant may not use a special mo-
tion to dismiss does not spell a victory for a plaintiff or a Pyrrhic 
victory for a defendant. As Intercon demonstrated, the immunity 
anti-SLAPP statute, section 4.24.510, still applied in federal court 
as a substantive defense.212 State law immunities are still substan-
                                                                                                                            
has amalgamated California’s anti-SLAPP and Rule 56, leaving a crippled anti-SLAPP 
statute that applies some, but not all, of each). 
208 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74. 
209 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
483, 493 (1928). 
210 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809). 
211 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 
(2010). 
212 See discussion supra Section II.C.2. 
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tive under Erie.213 Looking next at Abbas, the D.C. Circuit still dis-
missed plaintiff for failure to state a plausible defamation claim un-
der Rule 12(b)(6).214 The above cases demonstrate that federal 
courts are well-suited for early dismissal of meritless claims. This is 
especially important, as anti-SLAPP statutes exist to minimize the 
costs of a legal defense.215 
Finally, it is not at all certain that a plaintiff is likely to win on a 
public libel defamation case in the first instance. As highlighted in 
Section I.A, a libel defendant can rely on three structural protec-
tions: evidentiary, interpretive (a court will not quickly infer libel 
based on certain words and their possible meanings), and proce-
dural.216 Given these protections, resort to federal court may not 
result in the mischief that the anti-SLAPP statutes sought to reme-
dy. 
CONCLUSION 
Application of the federal rules will not completely disembowel 
the policy of the states to support free speech. First, they do not 
target all anti-SLAPP provisions, merely those that conflict with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal courts following Ab-
bas and the federal rules can still screen out meritless claims and 
protect free speech. Resort to federal courts may inevitably create 
divergences in the federal and state courts, but the U.S. Constitu-
tion has embedded this policy so that federal courts across the 
country may apply uniformly. Finally, applications of the federal 
rules will not result in a parade of horribles for libel defendants. 
The Supreme Court has erected protective barriers that, as a 
whole, maintain the important values of free speech in public socie-
ty. 
                                                                                                                            
213 See, e.g., Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 620–21 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the 
substantive law of Vermont governs the applicability of qualified immunity to plaintiff’s 
state law claims). 
214 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
215 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2011) (awarding costs and 
attorney’s fees to successful anti-SLAPP movants). 
216 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
